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DEVISING LAW: ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEGAL EMBLEMS

Pro lege et pro grege1
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a body of early modern legal doctrine, little studied and even less
remembered, that deals with the definition and use of images. Inherited from
classical Rome, the ius imaginum, or law of images, was most immediately concerned
with heraldic arms and the hierarchy of military, social, and ecclesiastical precedence
as represented visually and verbally in banners, shields, coats of arms, livery, color,
crests and other images and inscriptions, and in trophies and insignia placed in both
public and private spaces. It was, as John Selden puts it, the law that governed the
“titles of honor” of the nobility.2 While this ius imaginum may seem rather specific
and particular, concerned with archaic details of greater and lesser social dignities,
there is also a much more general interest and application to the doctrines governing
the composition and interpretation of images, and thence the proper context and
construction of the legal emblem tradition, which is the subject of this article. Why
did lawyers devise the doctrine of images and what do these images mean for law?
It is sometimes argued that the juristic emblem, associated most prominently
with Andreas Alciatus and his Emblematum liber of 1531, was an accidental invention,
the inspiration of a publisher who whimsically added woodcut illustrations to a book
of adages (moralizing maxims), but in fact the emblem belongs to a much older and
better-established tradition of visual representation.3 While Alciatus was entitled to
“baptize” his book with the novel name of Emblemata, the images that accompanied
the epigrams stemmed, as Alciatus elsewhere acknowledges, to a much more diverse
tradition of funereal, genealogical, military, and esoteric (hieroglyphic) figures. The
ius imaginum, in its broadest definition, is the study of what Selden terms “the
trophies of virtue,” the insignia of nobility, knowledge, honor, and law. This classical
doctrine of images governed all aspects of the visual presence of governance and
administration, the representation of family and lineage, private and public office,
sovereignty, and oeconomia (domestic administration).4 The science of symbols,
military and civil, was juristically a systematic lexicon, a collation of the lawful icons,
1.

“For the law and for the people,” a motto that is used in an exemplary emblem in Henri Estienne, The
Art of Making Devises 7 (London, Holden 1650).

2.

John Selden, Preface to Titles of Honor (London, Stansby 1631) (noting that “Nobility . . . being
rightly . . . the virtue of his Fathers” and then observing that in ancient Rome only the Nobiles could
show the Images of their ancestors). The ius imaginum here meant the right to house the ancestral
images and by extension the duty to maintain, which is to say stay true to, and keep faith with the image
of the forebears.

3.

John Manning, The Emblem, at ch. 1 (2002) (presenting a version of this genealogy). This view is
corrected with great erudition in Pierre Laurens, L’invention de l’emblème par André Alciat et le modèle
épigraphique, 149 Académie Des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 883 (2005). For a comprehensive
study of the classical and humanistic roots of the legal emblem tradition, see Valérie Hayaert, Mens
Emblematica et Humanisme Juridique (2008).

4.

Giorgio Agamben, Le Règne et La Gloire (2009). It is interesting to note that Antonio Nebrija
distinguishes oeconomus, referring to domestic administration, from iconomus, which concerns
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of such visibility. Colors, combinations, figures, and the relation of images to words
were all coded and defined so that the proper order of things seen, the visiocracy, can
be recognized and noted. The later common law systematizer, John Brydall, in his
treatise of 1675 indeed defines the ius imaginum as the study of the names of nobility,
that is the names of celebrity, whereby virtue is noted and social place represented.5
The emblem book was a legal invention of the Renaissance, but it belongs within
a much lengthier tradition of heraldry, arms, and along with them the fame or
notoriety that accompanied military heroics and political prominence. As the lawyer
John Ferne nicely puts it, the inherited insignia were only as valuable as their current
practices: “‘ancient statueas, smokie images, autentique coate armors, torne and
rotten guidons, of the valiant and virtuous ancestors’ will not of themselves repel the
enemy.”6 What was displayed had to be internalized, the images real, their
interpretation so serious a matter as to be a subject of law. The disciplinary rules and
lawful representations of what were variously termed insignia armorum, symbola
heroica, pictura, and images generally, latterly being translated into impresses, devises,
blazons, enigmas and symbols, required strict disposition. It is with this military and
administrative context that I will start and then subsequently move to the so-called
theatre of legal emblems.
II. ENSIGNS AND DIGNITIES

If war begins where language runs out, then it makes sense that the most basic
science of signs must deal in forms of visible communication that can be seen in
circumstances where language or, more exactly, diplomatic modes of conversation
have become impossible. Heraldry was the science of seeing from a distance. The
first logic of heraldry or, as it was also frequently termed, the law of arms, was thus
an external one, namely that of indicating the difference between friend and foe,
familiar and stranger, within the theatre of war. The study and systematization of
insignia involved the classification and ranking of all the visible elements used to
demarcate, distinguish, and transmit the identity of their bearer.7 Some of our early
modern authors stressed the religious origins of armorial symbols, stating that “they
go back before the flood to Seth the Son of Adam who took certain signs and marks
to distinguish his family from the children of Cain.”8 For other authors, the symbols
used were deemed to be “holy letters,” forms of “hierographie,” or more generally,
governance of the Church and matters ecclesiastical. Antonio Nebrija, Vocabularium Utrisuque
Iuris (Venice, Zalterum 1612).
5.

John Brydall, Jus Imaginis Apud Anglos; Or the Law of England Relating to the Nobility
and Gentry 2 (London, Billinger 1675) (“Nobilitas . . . hoc est, nominis Celebritas”).

6.

John Ferne, The Blazon of Gentrie 19 (London, Winder 1586).

7.

See generally Michel Pastoureau, Stratégies héraldiques et changements d’armoires chez les magnats Florentins
du XIVe siècle, 43 Annales ESC 1241 (1998).

8.

Charles Segoing, Trésor Héraldique ou Mercure Armorial: Oú Sont Demonstrées Toutes
Les Choses Necessaires Pour Acquérir une Parfaite Connaissance De L’art De Blazonner 4
(Paris, Clouzier 1652).
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secret missives carried between the divinity and its subjects in war or in peace.9 Thus
Marc de Vulson, in an intriguingly detailed work on the history of French heraldry,
offers as his first definition of “Kings of Arms” that they were “Messengers of the
sacred” who would convey “to all and indifferently, to friends and enemies with equal
certainty, the announcement of peace or the declaration of war, and always under the
protection of the law of nations [droict des gens].”10
To the extent that religion lay behind majesty and war alike—at least from the
beginning of nobilitas Christiana, the Christian era—the military origin of the
science of symbols does not preclude a theological derivation and interpretation.
Early modern rhetoricians were all “Christian soldiers” and this was as true of the
visual science of arms as of the art of speech.11 What matters is that the identity of
groups and persons needs to be visible—on
columns, buildings, shields, machines,
FIGURE 1 Guido Pancirolus at fol. 17v col
vestments, carriages, uniforms, banners, and
1 De imaginibus principum.
more. Visible signs, and in theological terms,
visible words, are key elements in the ritual
ordering of public and private spheres, the
realms of providence and fate alike. The
image of the sovereign (Principum vultus),
Pancirolus records in his commentary on the
Notitia dignitatum, is to be put on pillars in
the market and in other public places as well
as in private homes (fig. 1). These images are
to be honored and protected, and stringent
punishment was meted out to those who
defaced them.12 Bartolus, in his treatise on
insignia, the earliest but far from
comprehensive juristic work, defines the sign
as a name that is painted on coats of arms,
banners, shields and the walls of the city.13 It
9.

See Estienne, supra note 1; Peter Goodrich, Legal Enigmas—Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vinci Code,
and the Emendation of Law, 30 O.J.L.S. 71, 78 (2010).

10.

Marc de Vulson, De L’office des Roys D’armes, des Herauds, Et Des Poursuivans. De Leur
Antiquité, De Leurs Privileges, & Des Principales Ceremonies oú ils Sonty Employez par
les Roys & par les Princes 2 (Paris, Cramoisy 1645).

11.

See Bernard Lamy, The Art of Speaking, pt. 2, ch. 2, at § 2 (London, W. Godbid 1676) (translated
from the French the year after its original publication: “If Postures be propeer for defence [sic], in corporal
invasions; Figures are as necessary, in spiritual attacks. Words are the Arms of the Mind . . . .”).

12.

Guido Pancirolus, Notitia utraque dignitatum 17v (Lugudini, Gabiano 1608) (in the chapter de
imaginibus Principum: “Principum vultus auratae pilae impositi . . . Hi in foro vel alio loco publico, ac
privatis aedibus alias locabantur.”).

13.

Bartolus da Sassoferrato, Tractatus de Insigniis et Armis (1358), reprinted in Osvaldo
Cavallar et al., A GR AMMAR OF SIGNS (1994). For further discussion, see Peter Goodrich, A Note on
Icunculae, Pòlemos 3 (2009).
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FIGURE 2 Guido Pancirolus at fol. 109v Notitia Imagines
marks legitimacy, rank, and
Armariorvm.
subjection. Referring to Digest
1.8.8, Bartolus also suggests
that these signs are sacred.14
The representation of
legitimacy must be by means of
legitimate signs. While this
might seem tautological, it in
fact refers to the complex and
forgotten details of the
transcription of the full panoply
of facets of domestic and social
identity: the images of honor,
virtue, office, rank, and local
and national affiliations that
define the administration of a
territory. This is the visible and
most basic lex terrae, or law of
the land as common lawyers
term it, and it finds its first
expression in the insignia or
notitia of administrative regions
and offices. In the surviving
Roman sources, these take the
form of extensive listings of the
imperial territories and the
administrative off ices—the
dignities—through which they
were ordered and maintained.
The empire was represented in
Pancirolus (fig. 2)—although
Selden also reproduces this
image—as being suspended
under the armorial images of
divine providence: angels representing military knowledge and virtue hold up the
circular icon of the emperor’s face above the list, in the form of an array of books that
represent authority and felicity.
Beyond this, every province has its map (or properly, chorography) and insignia
of places—of towns, villages, routes, and borders. These then are depicted by way of
listing their visible dignities and offices, literally their viri illustris and their viri
spectabilis, translating for us as their manifest (we could also transliterate this as

14.

Dig. 1.8.8. (Marcian) (“Whatever has been defended and secured against human mischief is sacred
(sanctum).”).
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illuminated, embellished) and notable, meaning brilliant, remarkable, famous, and
even spectacular men.
Every office in every territory listed in the Notitia had its mark, its image, and its
insignum by which it was recognized and known. These were military and religious
of course, but also legal, commercial, scriptive, and domestic. The Notitia were the
signs of office and celebrity and included elaborate schemata for the Provost of the
Sacred Bedchamber, the Master of Missives, Letters and Records, as well as
innumerable clerks of oeconomic (domestic) duties, from maintenance of linens to
stocking of the kitchen. The point here is structural. The notes of office (dignitates)
formed the visual architecture of the social, carefully tabulated and inscribed by
lawyers—a beginning was made by Bartolus in the fourteenth century and by
Alciatus and Pancirolus in the sixteenth century—and available and visible in the
buildings, designs, figures, statuary, ceremonies, and vestments of those who
occupied the social and domestic roles that law purveyed. Celebrity emanated from
and imitated the sovereign’s court and what the herald Thynne termed the “arcana
imperii heraldorum,” the secrets of arms, were the rules whereby the insignia of the
court and of all the lesser and imitative courts of the nobility were to be composed
and interpreted as the manifestation of their lineage and legitimacy, their honour,
virtue, and felicity.
The rules governing insignia are recognized and indeed deferred to by the
common law and explicitly carry not simply the authority of life, death, and loss of
liberty, ius incarcerandi, in their military uses, but also bear an important acclamatory
function.15 Thus, to take one instance from the ceremony of investiture of honours,
honorific preferment, here membership of the Order of the Garter is in recognition
of “acts of the highest order of virtue, meriting the most praiseworthy status and
dignity of honor.”16 It needs, therefore, to be recognized that in addressing images in
law, the ius imaginum in its various modes and expressions, the subject matter is that
of ritual and ceremony, of praise and celebration, of honor and sanctification as
inscribed in the architecture of the social and in the figures of administrative and
political as well as legal presence. The image is extant in and through the living,
through the exemplary ambulant image, but such charismatic personages in their
nobility and majesty are but representative, the mere spectacle of the invisible
15.

Frauncis Thynne, A Discourse of the Dutye and Office of an Heraulde of Armes (1605),
reprinted in Thomas Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses, Written by Eminient
Antiquaries Upon Several Heads in our English Antiquities 260 (London 1720) (“& c’est bone
Justificacione al comen Ley & Ashton & Moyle concesserunt, que commen Ley prendra notice del Ley
del Constable & Marshall.”) This is worth citing for the French law if nothing else, and recognizes, by
citation to Justice Needham that the jurisdiction over social insignia, precedence, and honour is a civil
law jurisdiction, expressly derived from “Bartolus the Lawyer in the Government of Charles the fourth
Emperour” who incidentally, we are then told, “permitted to Gowne-men (or, as the French termeth
them, of the longe Robe, for under that name were learned men, Clergie men, and Schollers
comprehended) to beare Armoryes.” Id.

16.

Sir John Doderidge, A Consideration of the office and dutye of the Herauldes in Englande (1600), in Curious
Discourses 275 (Hearne ed., 1720) (“[Q]ui per Acta fortia laudabilia virtutesque honores status &
dignitates merebuntur.”).
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monuments, the unseen causes that exist ineffably and eternally. Honour, and also its
attributes, office, rank, lineage and law are greater than the living—they are
inheritances, they survive beyond the grave.17 The law and the oeconomic order are
founded alike upon the “Reverence and Honour, Fidelity and Subjection,” the allegiance
and obedience that is owed the sovereign and the parents, the heavenly and the
temporal father in their impossible unity.18 Dignitas non moritur, the dignity, which is
to say the image, the rite, the acclamation, the honour that inheritance passes on,
that time carries as vestige, impress and relic, does not die. It belongs in the domain
of dogma as Legendre interprets it, namely, the dream of the social, and the
imaginings of law.19
III. VISIOCRACY

The early modern systematization of common law, the mos Britannicus that I will
use as my example, inherited and elaborated a strict order for the composition and
construction of visible rule as precedence, hierarchy, and acclamatory order. 20 The
earliest source, already mentioned, was the late Roman Notitia dignitatum in its
various Renaissance reconstructions, and Bartolus’ mid-fourteenth century treatise
on signs. Bartolus is the earlier and more schematic work and his concern throughout
is the legitimacy of representations of rank and office. The basic categories of the law
of images concern the dignities that the earlier Roman Notitia had listed. Thus those
of the specified rank could bear the insignia of that rank, be it proconsul, legate,
bishop or doctor of law, but “if someone who is not of that rank bears them he incurs
the charge of fraud.”21 Further rules govern the appropriate signs of subjection to
Lord and King that the arms should insert. In addition to that, Bartolus notes the
rules that governed how insignia should be composed, namely, that they should
imitate the order of nature, which was to be supplemented by the requirement that
representation of social dignities had to observe the hierarchy of the social order:
“nobler things should be preferred and placed in a privileged position,” the right and

17.

Thynne, supra note 15, at 236 (citing the maxim “quod consuetudo dat, homo tollere non potest,”) (translated as
“what custom—time immemorial, the invisible cause, the unseen mover—gives, man cannot take away”).

18.

Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae 3 (London, Gosling 1453) (discussing the proper
“filial fear” of law); see also Sir Matthew Hale, The Analysis of the Law 42 (London, John Walthoe
1713) (a later and much more secular source, which lists these rights or duties as defining the subject).

19.

See Pierre Legendre, L’Empire de la vérité: Introduction aux Espaces Dogmatiques
Industriels 25–34 (Fayard 1983) (tracing the etymological link between honour, decorum, dignity
and dogma); Pierre Legendre, L’Autre Bible de l’Occident: Étude sur l’architecture
Dogmatiques des Societies 55–59 (Fayard 2009) (elaborating on the theme from L’Empire de la vérité
in interesting ways in relation to architecture and Vasari in particular); see also Ernst Kantorowicz,
The King’s Two Bodies: Studies in Medieval Political Theology (1958) (offering an important
discussion of the concept of dignity).

20. On the mos britannicus and the development of the English ius commune, see Peter Goodrich, Intellection

and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. & Soc’y 460 (2009).
21.

Bartolus, supra note 13, at 109 1.12.
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top of the coat of arms being nobler
than the bottom and left.22 Similarly,
colours have their proper order and
meaning, descending from gold to
purple and red, which latter colours
were restricted, Bartolus states, to
princes.23
The basic elements of the
heraldic art, the proper order of
colours, metals, stones, and animals,
form a simple lexicon of the visual
signs of a highly regulated manifest
social, military, and ecclesiastical
hierarchy. The order of precedence
and rank is arranged to reflect what
is technically the celebrity of the
bearer and is coded and collated to
the order of virtues, the honours
attained and inherited. It is worth
emphasising this foundational
moment, this visual schema of law,
and observing that in the early
systematizing works it is conceived
explicitly to be a ref lection of the
order and hierarchy of angels:

FIGURE 3 Gerard Legh, The Accedens of Armory at
fol. 135v (Herald).

[A]lmightie God is the originall authour of honouringe noblilitie, who, even
in the heavens hathe made a discrepance of his heavenly Spirites, givinge
them severall names, as Ensignes of honour. And these heavenly Spirites,
when they are sent of God, are called, Angeli, Angels, which in the Greek
tongue signifieth, sent. 24

Pause for an example, taken from Legh, the earliest of the Inns of Court authors on
heraldic law who offers an instructive image of a herald at the end of the 1572 edition
of his Accedens. Here we can see what the legal scientist of symbols saw and follow his
interpretation of the visual clues that the picture relays (fig. 3).
22.

Id. at ¶¶ 116–117, 1.290–.294.

23.

Id. at ¶ 117 1.323–.327. The same can be extracted in greater details from later systematic works, such
as John Bosewell, Workes of Armorie, Devyded Into Three Bookes, Entituled, The
Concorde of Armorie, the Armorie of Honor, and of Cotes & Creastes (London, Totell
1572); and Gerard Legh, The Accedens of Armory (London, Totell 1562). Jones’ edition of John
Trevor, Llyfr Arfau/Book of Arms (1943) is also important.

24.

John Bosewell, Workes of Armorie fol. 10r (London, Totell 1572) (continuing to note that “the
Lawe of Armes was by the auncient heraultes grounded upon these orders of Angells in heaven,
encorowned with the pretious stones, of colours, and vertues diverse . . . .”).
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The image of the angelic herald is not obvious—not immediately visible—to
contemporary view. It is emblematic, though not precisely an emblem, as will be
discussed later, because it lacks an explanatory verse. It is properly a “devise” (or
imprese) and serves to devise, which is to say to invent and convey a message of art.25
Initially the context of the devise or “holy letter” has to be reinstated. It is a
representation, here in image and vernacular motto, of the earthly reflection of the
“heavenly ierarches” and specifically of the system of law which Legh specifies in
terms of “order, cunning and working.”26 Order here represents office—dignity and
recognized rank—while cunning is reason in the sense of disposition and
administration, and working is service, obedience to the hierarchy, “following the
conformitie, and likenes of god.” The nine orders of Angels duly acknowledged, and
“the glorie of his countenance in heaven” properly imagined, amen, then the image
can be viewed as the spectacle of the relation between the temporal order and the
celestial hierarchy, between government, nature, and divinity, seamlessly joined in
one image. This is a matter of signs and their laws as boldly presented in the figure
of the herald in a white shirt dotted with black spurs (mullets Sable, in the armorial
argot).
The herald is the messenger, the master of signs and wears on his shirt an
escutcheon or shield representing the arms of England devised by “holye Edwarde
kinge and confessor.”27 He is thus immediately identified and placed: our herald, the
representative and distributor of common law. To this we can add a rod of office in
his right hand, pointing to a flag, and in his left hand the tail end of a banner with
words of criticism inscribed, effectively stating that in cold weather more clothes are
needed. The herald responds, at the foot of the devise, by saying that any clothes will
do in haste until more can be had. Legh cites Bartolus in support of this proposition,
arguing that any clothes will do provided that the symbols that they bear are visible.
What matters for the message is not the quantity of clothing but the visibility and
legibility of the sign. Put more strongly, the messenger—text, shirt, skin, or coat—is
subordinate to the missive which attaches properly neither to body nor materiality,
but to the invisible and celestial source that sent it. It is for this reason, because of the
intrinsically chimerical, “aereall,” or vanishing quality of the visible, that the science
of signs is necessary and the place of the herald and latterly hermeneut is significant.
The rod of office held in the right hand points to the flag on the standard that is
held by the dragon. The two animals, dragon and panther, represent, respectively,
ferocity and amiability, war and peace, fear and love. Between the two is the center

25.

Samuel Daniell, The Worthy Tract of Paulus Iovius, Contayning a Discourse of Rare
Inventions, Both Militarie and Amorous Called Imprese 6r (London, Waterson 1585) (defining
the prose of the art: “[to shadow] suerly their purposes and intents by figures . . . By a Serpent [they
signified] pollicie. By an Olive peace. By a Gote, lust . . . This was the first foundations of Imprese . . . .”).

26. Legh, supra note 23, at fol. 135v.
27.

Id. at fol. 136r.
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image, a banner on which is inscribed the motto, familiar in some form to all
common lawyers, “That lawe alloweth must needes be Reason.”28
The most striking feature of the devise lies in the conjunction of law, reason, and
the visible. The herald, the English herald, is the messenger of common law. He is the
index and manifest spectacle of the order of reason and the architecture of legality. He
is conceived as an image and presented as a devise for transmitting in a didactic and
accessible form the power and the glory of law, its draconian force and its facilitative
felicity, its conjunction of authority and reason, threat and allure. It is thus that the
periphery of the image refers to clothes, to the question of vestment as a matter of the
signification of identity in the visible realm. Law, we are told, allows these vestments;
they are reason in the sense of being fit to the office of the herald and subordinate to
the task of conveying messages. Then, in the center of the image, under the rod of
office and authority, is the motto, technically the soul of the devise. Here we learn that
what law allows is necessarily reasonable. This requires a little reconstruction.
First, as we know, what is reasonable is legal. At an allegorical level, what is
reasonable is what is allowed. What is allowed is what is visible in the figure of the
devise, the order of places, and the hierarchy manifest in the public and domestic
spaces, within the providential and oeconomic spheres respectively. What is seen is “a
spectacle of things invisible,” an enigmatic mirror, as St. Paul has it, onto a world
unseen and still to come. The licit order of things, the visible status quo, is the
manifestation of a presumed legality, an esoteric and covert order of being. Second,
at the level of doctrine, the words convey a rationality that belongs to and refers more
or less directly to prior and unseen causes. The image, which is variously termed a
figure, a body, nature or event is to be understood as a glass, a lens onto anima legis,
the soul of law that only the wise can see and then only in part. The devise, as a
figure and as an image, thus represents a structural and necessarily absent order. In
the case of the Roman imago or funereal mask, the structure represented by the
image—the effigy—was that of lineage, of the ancestors and their nobility. For the
authors of the devises the image is similarly a figure, a reason and law that gains a
momentary materiality in the visible world. The devise is a prosopopoeia, according to
Estienne, a personification of abstract and incorporeal ideas, the dictates of an
unwritten law. 29 The image thus represents the exteriority of a larger and hidden
design. It is the outer shell, the mark, vestige or impression left by the hidden order
and structure of being as law.
The English philosopher and lawyer Abraham Fraunce, author of the Lawier’s
logike, also wrote on the philosophy of symbols. In the fourth book of his treatise on
armorial insignia the opening sentence defines the symbol as “a representation by
which something is concealed” and then proceeds to interpret the symbol thus defined

28. Plowden is often cited for the maxim semblable reason semblable ley—like reason like law; but it is Edward

Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1797) [1628], who offers the best discussion of reason as
the spirit of law and distinguishing ratio vera et legalis from merely apparent reason.
29. Estienne, supra note 1, at 54.
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as a species of synecdoche, the rhetorical figure of part for whole.30 The image, meaning
the figure used in the devise, is viewed by Fraunce as a literal mark, an impression left
by the structure of being, by nature and law as orders that express a much greater but
unfortunately invisible schema of causes. At its strongest, Fraunce defines the image as
a legal bond, an obligation, and an undertaking, which the bearer of the sign will
acknowledge and obey the intention of its unseen author, be it God, nature, sovereign,
ancestor, or parent who devised the image and so left their mark upon the order of
things seen and recognized as allowed by law and therefore reasonable.
Returning to Legh’s devise of the herald we can note certain other features.
Center stage, the herald touches the flag with his rod and the figure speaks. This
signifies that what law strikes comes to life, is brought to speech, unveils and divulges
meaning to its authorized audience. This, as the central banner and words disclose,
is allowed by law and therefore is reasonable. More than that, this image of
interpretation and transmission is emblematic of the art of law, which brings nature
to life and dead letters to speech. The image is of the herald, the messenger of law,
bringing nature to expression, ostensively, as a personification, as power and glory,
force and love. The visible and inanimate or painted realm, nature as dormant matter,
together with the animals and standards, vestments and instruments shown, are all
symbols that form part of an order of reason and law. The task of the jurist is to
contrive the expression of an occluded intention, and to interpret the signs of the
hidden legislator, be it the Christian Deus absconditus, Leviathan or salus populi, the
will of the people in its immemorial and encrypted forms. All nature signifies and
law is the pattern of that signification. At the same time all signs are synecdoches,
marks of an anterior and interior intention and meaning. That is the nature of
learning and the medium of law for the early modern era. As Plowden put it, and as
Fraunce reiterates, even the word must be conceived as nothing other than the image
of the legal rule, the sign of the legislator’s intent, or the impression of the speaker’s
devise and desire.
IV. LEGAL EMBLEMS

Writing towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit scholar and
systematizer François Menestrier opens his treatise The Philosophy of Images by
observing that the art of devises is the single strongest taste of the century. 31 This
inspires Menestrier to produce a comprehensive selection of devises according to the
twin criteria of justice and spirituality, law and theology. The devise, in this schema,
is a liminal image, an envelope, the material exterior and visible moment of a spiritual
cause that becomes, once manifest, law for us. The image as sign always in this
tradition refers to an anterior structure, to the idea, ideal, and idiom that underpin
30. Abraham Fraunce, Insignium Armorum, Emblematum, Hieroglyphicorum et Symbolorum

fol. M2r (London, Orwin 1588).
31.

François Menestrier, La Philosophie des Images, Composée d’un Ample Receuil des Devises,
& du Jugement de Tous les Ouvrages qui ont été Faits sur Cette Matiere fol. A I r (Paris,
Caille 1682).
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and explain it. Menestrier elsewhere cites Psalm 18: “he made darkness [tenebras] his
hiding place and canopy,” meaning that there is an element of the esoteric and
enigmatic to all signs, for their cause lies in shadow and darkness, in another realm,
a theme that is taken up very explicitly in the systematizing works.32 The Cambridge
scholar Philipot makes the same point eloquently: “The Egyptians folded up their
Learning in the dark contexture of Hieroglyphicks, the Greeks wrap’d up theirs in
the gloomy Vesture of Emblems, and the Romans lodg’d it behind the cloudy Traverse
of Allegorical Allusions pourtrai’d in those Mysterious Signatures that adorn’d the
Reverse of their Coin . . . .”33
The emblem is a subspecies of devise. It has a lengthy pre-history of legal
significance, being the term that jurists would use to refer to ornaments or other
images inserted into objects. Antonio de Nebrija, in his legal dictionary from the
very beginning of the sixteenth century, a quarter century before Alciatus’ little
book, defines the emblem as the form of insets painted on vases, mosaic inlays in
tiled floors, inserted images in vestments or any other marquetry or ornament put
into and absorbed by a foreign surface. It is a term devised, according to Menestrier,
by the jurisconsults, for any assembled image, combination of colors, that ornament
an object, a surface, or a structure.34 It is, by extension, the image of its cause, the
meaning and message of the mosaic, habit, monument, or building in which it is
inserted. Thus Philipot offers the concept of the emblem as icuncula or, little icon,
the legitimate representation of office—in this case that of a priest—that is inserted
into their vestments.35 So too the trappings of positive law had their symbols, their
legitimate modes of expression, their visible signs of provenance and authority. The
legal emblem is most simply the legitimate image of law as a mixed knowledge and
practice, as an expression of “things divine and human,” as rule and administration,
legislation and oeconomic disposition.
If we look to the standard definitions of the distinction between devise and
emblem, the devise is particular in that it represents a specific and identifiable
person, family, city, or nation, while the emblem is general and at its best is “the art
of painting morals, and of putting the operations of nature in images for the
instruction of men.”36 It is this instructional and didactic purpose of emblems that
chiefly distinguishes them from devises. Thus, the devise uses a motto and such is
expressly to be obscure, ideally in Latin, as a talisman or secret knowledge and key to
the noble identity of the bearer. The words are thus to be “neither too intelligible, nor
yet too obscure” and to this we can add, borrowing from Fraunce, that where the
32.

François Menestrier, La Philosophie des Images Enigmatique fol. A v r (Lyon, Baritel 1694).

33.

Thomas Philipot, A Brief Historical Discourse of the Original and Growth of Heraldry,
Demonstrating upon what rational Foundation, that Noble and Heroick Science is
Established 1 (London, Tyler and Holt 1672).

34. François Menestrier, L’Art des Emblemes ou Senseigne la Morale par les Figures de la

Fable, de l’Histoire, & de la Nature 2–3 (Paris, Caille 1684).
35.

Philipot, supra note 33, at 7.

36. Menestrier, supra note 34, at 3 (citing to Claude Mignault’s commentaries on Alciatus as his authority).
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motto of the devise does not refer to the image, and so is enigmatic, in the emblem
the words describe and interpret the figure.37 Thus the emblem is designed to be
relatively accessible, is more free in its use of images, and is constructed to achieve
the end of making the foundations of law—its roots in nature, reason, and moral
use—visible to a populace that was often unable to read, or as Fraunce formulates it:
“letters just like languages are intelligible only to their own people, whereas the
images of animals, plants and suchlike are known and patently obvious to all just like
languages their own.”38 Mignault, in his commentary on Alciatus, belabors the same
point: “maxims are sometimes rather obscure, and may not be accessible to everyone;
but the emblem, either because of the picture which is the subject, or through the
explanation given by the poem or through the inscription, has some facility in which
the mind can be at ease.”39
Drawing out the implications of Mignault’s commentaries, we can note first and
literally that Alciatus’ emblems begin with an emblem of dedication and authorization.
These are lawful and hierarchically approved emblems. The first emblem, opening for
content, is of the Duke of Milan, and depicts the ensign of the Duchy. The central
figure of this emblem is a shield showing a twisting snake from whose mouth a child
emerges. The verse below explains the image
as representing nobility of pedigree—gentilitiis
FIGURE 4 Andreas Alciatus, Emblemata,
at 61 (Ganymede).
nobile stemma tuis. The verse then proceeds to
explain that the figure of the snake indicates
he is the progeny of divine seed. This is the
lineage and visible majesty of law, its reference
back, its place in the hierarchy, such as to allow
the sovereign to promulgate by means of their
authority, what the Digest terms “a knowledge
of civil law which is a most sacred wisdom (res
sanctissima civis sapientia).”40 The fourth
emblem (fig. 4), titled In Deo laetandum, one
must delight in God, reinforces the message of
the divine provenance of these images and
their messages. Taken quite superficially, the
figure shows Ganymede being borne through
the heavens on the wings of an Eagle. The motto, in Greek, stipulates cryptically, as
already noted, that one must delight in God. Travelling through the clouds, amongst the
angels, Ganymede looks forward and upward. Below, on earth, a dog barks at the
disappearing image.
37.

Abraham Fraunce, Symbolicae Philosophiae Liber Quartus et Ultimus 14 (John Manning
ed., 1991).

38. Id. at 9.
39.

Claude Mignault, Omnia Andreae Alciati Emblemata cum Commentariis (Antwerp, Plantin
1577) (Letter to the Reader).

40. Dig. 50.13.5 (Ulpian).
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Mignault prefaces his commentary on this emblem by noting that it is taken
from Homer and that it is to be interpreted by reference to classical mythology,
which is to say by reference to stories that “the early lawyers” used so as to acquire
and increase their authority.41 That said, the image is followed by a verse explanation
that, in most editions, was in the vernacular, and helped to explain the emblem as
the means by which the minds of early viewers were “captured and charmed.” As to
the image itself, the key feature is that Ganymede is a child, an innocent, carried to
the heavens through his love of God and it is this filial devotion to divinity and law
that the figure captures. The subject of law should be such a child, empty and open
to being carried away at a literal level by the word of the father, and allegorically by
the wings of an eagle, the queen of birds. The child comes to God and in doing so
separates soul from body through joy and rejoicing (gaudium). To be carried amongst
the clouds, symbols of angels, is to join the celestial choir, to sing praise through
one’s being as such, and to attach to the divine in a spiritual friendship—animae
amicitiam.42 It was this spiritual friendship, the amity and brotherhood of a law both
spiritual and temporal that constitutes the first precept, maxim, or rule of the
emblems that ensue.
Another common juristically directed emblem, number 18 in Alciatus, but the
opening emblem in the first vernacular emblem book, given pride of place and principal
import by the Toulousian humanist Guillaume Perrière, is the figure of Janus. The
two-faced God directly represents past and future, backwards and forwards, but
equally, and this is explicit in the symbolism of the vernacular figure, the two realms of
governance, exterior and interior, secular and spiritual. It is to this end that the
representation in Perrière, reprised in the English translation by Thomas Combe,
shows Janus holding an image, in classical terms a funerary mask (imago), in his right
hand—in patribus visum est, as Renaissance lawyers liked to say, meaning thus is the
father seen. In his left hand, towards which the mask is seemingly turned, he holds the
key, the mode of entry to the kingdom, clavis regni in the language of the Psalm.43 John
Selden explicates this division in terms of the divide between the interior and the
exterior realms, the household and the populus, but it is also a distinction between
providence and fate, rule and administration, legislation and oeconomic disposition.44
The accompanying verse specifically refers to providence as the source of governance
and the key held in Janus’ left hand is expressly an image of the mode of entry to the
celestial realm of providence itself. Janus marks thus the two regimes of law, the
41.

Andrea Alciati, Emblemata 61 (Padua, Petro Paulo Tozzi 1621) (discuss Claude Mignault’s
commentary to Alciatus).

42.

Id. at 64.
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Guillaume de la Perrière, Le Thëatre Des Bons Engins [1540] (Lyon, Denis Janot 1553);
Thomas Combe, Theater of Fine Devices [1593] (London, Richard Field 1614).

44. John Selden, Jani Anglorum Facies Altera (London, I. Helme 1610) (using this image and the

following motto: e quibus haec facies populum spectat, at illa larem). On the distinction between providence
and fate, derived from Boethius, see Agamben, Le Règne et La Gloire, supra note 4, at 190–201, on
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FIGURE 5 Perriere, Le Theatre, 1 (Janus).
exterior and positive which is in Christian
terminology but a shadow or image of the
interior, invisible, and enigmatic cause (fig. 5).
The authority and lineage of the emblem
established, its sacral and mysterious content
presupposed and symbolized, the second
feature of the emblem as presented by
Mignault lies in the juridical character of its
content. The emblem emerges out of a
tradition of adages, maxims, precepts,
formulas, and rules—whether the latter are
termed brocards, regulae or commonplaces.
These short and often poetic statements of
moral and legal precepts were developed in
part as an accessible species of mnemonic
device but had their greatest authority and most visible presence as expressions of
lawful conduct and of just reasoning.45 The legal maxim was of the greatest legitimacy
and indisputable prestige within common law where the Latin maxims collected by
Sir Francis Bacon and relayed by Sir Edward Coke were expressly “conclusions of
reason . . . aptly called legum leges, lawes of lawes,” and had both authority and
majesty, power and glory, whether “penn’ed or dicted verbatim.”46 The maxims were
the principles, the underlying reasons of law and as such deserved emblematic
expression. These were the discovered and self-evident grounds of all legality and
judgment and it is these reasons, these precepts for living, these items of dogma and
doctrine that the legal emblem takes up and conveys. Estienne in his discussion of
the utility of devises also refers to the use of images “the contentment of sight” as a
means of conveying doctrine and so promulgating not simply law but the reasons
that constitute the law of law.47 This space of pictorial representation of doctrine, this
visible enactment of judgment, to borrow from Junius, occurs in a space of public
spectacle where judgment is made visible and plain to see.48
The notes of dignity and other armorial colors and signs, shields, crests, banners
and the like, were visual identifications of place and lineage. The emblems expanded
the scope of such visible marks to the project of moral identification and thus the
inculcation of the primary norms, the customs and uses, that make up the unwritten
and perhaps, we would say, the unconscious law. The emblems, no doubt ironically,
promulgated and disseminated images of an invisible source, a law of law, which
45.

On the mnemonic role of poetry and the theatre of memory, see Giulio Camillo, L’Idea del Theatro
(Florence, Lodovico Domenicho 1550), reprinted in Le Théâtre de la Mémoire (Scheffer ed., 2007).
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More 1630).
47.

Estienne, supra note 1, at 14.
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undergirded and authorized the extant books, rolls, opinions, and reports of the legal
community. Thus, for Alciatus, “it is neither the words written on parchment nor those
engraved on bronze that constitute the law, but rather it is that which justice dictates,
and which equity directs that bears the true name of the law (verum legis nomen habet).”49
The images and figures of the emblem tradition were didactic and popularizing modes
of disseminating the moral content of law and the rules of spiritual amity and temporal
civility that provided the context of law application and reception.
Viewed juristically, the legal emblem in its most general sense, that of a visual
figure addressing topics pertaining to law, should be understood as a rhetorical
device. As Hayaert elaborates it, choosing the Senneton brothers magnificently
illustrated edition of the Corpus iuris civilis published in five volumes from 1548–
1550, the images were a matter of elegance of style, of subtlety of disputation, and of
force of persuasion. In the case of the Senneton edition, the images were broadly
illustrative, representing specific titles—rubrics or principles of law—in carefully
coded figures and gestures. This symbolic
visual lexicon would please and engage the
FIGURE 6 Corpus Iuris Civilis (Senneton
subject while also fulfilling the important
edition) (Dig. 3.1.5).
role of making manifest the mythological
roots of the legal injunctions. The
illustrations were in this sense technically
enigmas, meaning references to antique
poetic and literary texts that were the sources
of the rules of law.50 The Digest title de
postulando (rights of action) is illustrated by
an image of a judge (praetor) whose left hand
is held out staying a child and a woman who
turn or are turned away. On the judge’s right,
towards whom his face is turned, are two
men appointed to defend the woman and
child. The text illustrated spells out the
prohibition of actions being brought by those
under the age of seventeen or by women. As
for the latter, the reason is given in terms of a
“modesty in keeping with their sex” and then
refers to the classical story of Carfania “a
shameless woman who . . . brazenly made
applications to the magistrate”51 (fig. 6).

49. Andrea Alciatus, Oratio in Laudem Juris Civilis, in Opera Omnia 1v, at 1022 (Bâle, 1582); see

also Valérie Hayaert, Mens Emblematica et Humanisme Juridique 198–99 (2008).
50. See Peter Goodrich, Legal Enigmas—Antonio de Nebrija, The Da Vinci Code, and the Emendation of

Law, 30 O.J.L.S. 71 (2010) (discussing the meaning of aenigmata iuris or legal enigmas).
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FIGURE 7 Alciatus, Emblemata, (scholar
The image itself is taken fairly directly
captured by love).
from Alciatus’ Emblemata and specifically,
emblem 109, In Studiosum captum amore, a
legal scholar (iuris peritus) overcome by love
(fig. 7). The earlier emblem is if anything
more explicit and in a relatively lewd manner
portrays the threat of lust and here the lure of
the lascivious and feminine undermining law.
The enthroned scholar-judge is shown looking
towards a naked Venus, his left hand stretched
out towards her sex, his right hand pointing
toward Eros who stands bow in hand to the
right of Venus. On the other side of the
scholar stands Athena with spear and shield
to hand, representing justice in its classical
definition as an art graced by both arms and laws. The affective symbolic grammar of
the emblem, to borrow Hayaert’s locution, is one that depicts in visceral and memorable
form the separation (and connection) of public and private spaces, res publica and domus,
law and gynaeceum that the tradition constantly revises and relays. The emblem
presents temptation and affective relation as the left hand of law, the unconscious and
oceanic other scene, the realm of administration, of the law of non-law in Agamben’s
terms, that is kept at a distance, contained yet pressing at the chirological barrier of
legality. The lawyer has been ensnared and of this the relevant maxim is non bene
convenit—it leads to no good. This emblematic visual source is then transferred to the
legal text, the holy writ of law in its day, to enliven, to figure and give effect to the
juristic interdiction upon actions, “[t]he image has at least a triple status: a cordial or
one could say expressive function, a pedagogic and mnemonic role and an affective and
symbolic dimension.”52 Here then, in interlinear or more accurately non-linear form,
there is a a more popular grammar, a guide to and glimpse of the poetic cause, the
invention and motive of this institutional reason that captures the subject for law. It is
the symbol, as Legendre has lengthily elaborated, that gets under the skin, that has
effects, or in the Latin maxim, id efficit, quod figurat.53

V. CONCLUSION

There is perhaps no better expression of the lure and the doctrinal ruse of the
emblem than that to be found in Thomas Combe’s edition of The Theater of Fine
Devices.54 The question posed in the preface to Combe’s work is that of the differential
effects of image and word. The written text, the linear and ever so insensible dictates
52.
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of prose, will all too often pass the reader by and thereby gain little or no consideration,
let alone having any affective impact. Thus Combe moves to contrast the image to
the word, detailing that “pictures that especially are discerned by the sense, are such
helps to the weaknes of cõmon understandings, that they make words as it were
deedes, and set forth the whole substance of that which is offered, before the sight
and conceipt” of the viewer. The emblem is a mode of performance, not simply a
speech act and illocutionary force but more than that, an enactment, a moment in
the visible theatre of legal rule. Here, and quite vividly, the dead letter of legal prose
comes to life, takes to the stage, gets up and walks, and in doing so becomes law for
us, the viewers, the audience, the spectators of an administration of justice that has
always been fairly expressly a theatrical mode of implementation replete with its aura
of majesty, spectacle of place, agon of trial, and insignia of dissemination.
Returning to the lawyers who
devised the emblem tradition, the
FIGURE 8 Perriere, Theatre, title page.
performative character of law’s visual
modes of presence and promulgation
are very evident. The emblem is
explicitly a theatrical device. Perrière’s
Thëatre not only uses theater as its
title but also invokes “engins,” which
in this context refers to stage
machinery, the engines, scaffolds, or
props that are used to make actors
appear in front of their spectators.
The emblem is a dramatic machine
that helps devise, if you will, the
mode and method of performance.
The emblems in Perrière’s work (fig.
8) are indeed presented as figures on
stage, with the title page itself in the
form of a theatre.
The lawyer Pierre Coustau takes
up this theme in his Pegma cum
narrationibus philosophicis of 1555.55
The work consists of a collection and
expansive philosophical annotation of
emblems. The opening emblem is a
portrait of justice—in simulachrum
Iustitiae—and shows her holding a child to each breast, suckling war on her right nipple
and law on her left. Seated on a throne with a curtain behind her, this pedagogic tableau
evidently stages an image, a dramatic mask portraying the two orders of rule and
governance, of providence and fate as understood by the Renaissance jurists whose
55.
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tradition of images we inherit. Barthèlemy Aneau, a year earlier had used a not dissimilar
image of Justitia in his Jurisprudentia, a work that presented in visual and textual form the
biographical history and portraits of great jurists as an introduction to the institution of
law.56 Iustitia in Aneau’s image is interesting for being placed on a stone pedestal, the
book of laws in her left hand, declaiming to an audience of blindfolded subjects. It is here
again the staging, the theatrical natural machinery of presence and play, that are of
significance.
For Coustau, justice is even more explicitly staged, a social performance upon the
two scenes, external and internal, military and domestic, that his opening image
portrays. In Anglican terminology law is a nursing father and passes an interior spirit
of animation, a living voice, via its spectacles and stages. The concept of pegma is
very much to the point and highly indicative, its reference being a pedestal, scaffold
or other theatrical device whose origin lies in the shelves and cupboards that were
used classically to display the imago, or mask, of the ancestors who ruled from the
atrium of the house. The image was there the archetype of governance, a visible
visage that overlooked domestic space and represented in spectral form the lineage
and inheritance, the honor and virtue of the family and the place and genealogical as
well as moral qualification of the subject. The law of images was the pattern of
inheritance, the order and titles of honor, the symbolic grammar of governance as it
inhabited the most proximate and interior domains of the subject. And then, as a last
point, the tradition of legal emblems arrived on the social stage as a novel apparatus
for the promulgation and dissemination of the idea of law. The emblem presented
what Combe terms the “whole substance of that which is offered,” meaning in
contemporary jargon, “the big picture,” the social face of the “conceipt” of law. The
power of the image lay in its ability to carry and apply the abstract rule, the prosaic
letter of governance to a terrain that law in its positive scriptural expression would
never reach.

56. Bathelemy Aneau, Jurisprudentia a Primo et Divino Sui Ortu ad Nobilem Biturgium
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